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Issue 2

COURT REPORTS

of personal characteristics of the owner when considering shoreland
variances, and that would have required modification or overruling of
Supreme Court case law. The court also held that the legislative mandate,
statutory scheme, and compelling state interest, dictates that the supreme
court's prohibition against considering personal characteristics controls,
and the WFHA was inapplicable here. Because the setback requirements
do not single out Klint and do not impose requirements different from those
imposed on all others, the board had not discriminated against Klint.
The court concluded that the zoning board had not engaged in
discrimination and the Department lacked authority to order the board to
grant the variance and dismiss the citation for violating the setback.
Sommer Poole
O-Ton-Kah Park v. Wisconsin Dep't of Natural Resources, 604
N.W.2d 34 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that easement holders with
riparian rights were not 'riparian owners' eligible for pier permits, and
statute allowing non-riparian owners to maintain a pier was inapplicable
because the pier did not meet the statutory requirements).
O-Ton-Kah Park ("Subdivision") was a subdivision near a lake that did
not contain any riparian property. The Subdivision, however, owned an
easement that allows its residents access to nearby Lake Beulah.
Subdivision wanted to construct a pier on the lake, but the Wisconsin
Department of Natural Resources ("DNR") denied Subdivision's permit
application.
After an administrative hearing and district court order
affirming the DNR's decision, Subdivision brought this appeal.
Subdivision claimed the DNR's decision was wrong for two reasons.
First, Subdivision claimed it had a right to construct a pier as a riparian
easement holder. Second, Subdivision claimed, in the alternative, that it
was allowed, by statute, to maintain the pier without a permit. The
Wisconsin Court of Appeals quickly dismissed each of Subdivision's
arguments.
Addressing Subdivision's first claim, the court held that it ran contrary
to clear statutory language. The court recognized that the statutes granted
"riparian owners" and "riparian proprietors" the right to construct piers,
but not "riparian easement holders." Finding the term "riparian owner"
well defined under Wisconsin law as "one who holds title to land abutting a
body of water," the court rejected Subdivision's argument that the term
was ambiguous. Thus, the court refused to include Subdivision, by virtue
of its easement, under the statutory provision pertaining to owners.
The court then turned to Subdivision's second argument. Subdivision
had alternatively argued that it fell under the statutory exception allowing
entities to maintain piers without permits. Focusing on the statutory text,
however, the court realized the exception only applied to piers that had
been placed seasonally in the same place at least once every four years
since the easement was recorded. Because Subdivision's easement had
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been written in 1939, and Subdivision had placed its first pier in 1989,
Subdivision failed to meet the statutory requirement. Accordingly, the
court affirmed the DNR's decision to deny Subdivision's pier application.
Michael Fischer
Silver Lake Sanitary Dist. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Natural Resources,
No. 99-0620, 1999 WL 1125252 (Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 9, 1999) (holding
that the Department of Natural Resources ("DNR") did not have standing
as a state agency to challenge the constitutionality of two Wisconsin
statutes).
Silver Lake Sanitary District ("Silver Lake") sought judicial review of
the Department of Natural Resources' ("DNR") decision to set the
Ordinary High Water Mark ("OHWM") for Big Silver Lake at 868.9 feet
above mean sea level. The OHWM is an important boundary because it
establishes the extent of state ownership in the lake, which impacts the
public's right to use the lake as well as the riparian owners' rights in the
land above it.
As a direct response to Silver Lake's suit, the legislature enacted a
statute, which set the OHWM of Big Silver Lake at 867 feet above mean
sea level. This statutory OHWM was nearly two feet below DNR's mark.
The DNR subsequently filed a counterclaim challenging the
constitutionality of the statute on four grounds: (1) it was a local bill in a
multiple subject bill and therefore invalid under Wisconsin's Constitution;
(2) it violated the public trust doctrine; (3) it violated the equal protection
clause; and (4) it unlawfully encroached on the executive branch's
authority. In granting the DNR's motion for declaratory judgment, the
circuit court held that (1) the DNR had standing to challenge the
constitutionality of the law; and (2) the statute was unconstitutional.
After several months, the legislature enacted a second statute
permitting a sanitary district to set the OHWM of any lake that was wholly
within its district. The second statute also prohibited the DNR from setting
a different level. The DNR filed a second counterclaim in response to the
second statute's enactment, seeking a declaratory judgment that this statute
was also unconstitutional. The circuit court held that the second statute
was unconstitutional because it violated the public trust doctrine and the
forever-free clause of the Wisconsin Constitution. The court of appeals
granted Silver Lake's petition for leave to appeal both orders.
Silver Lake argued that the circuit court erred in concluding that the
DNR had standing to challenge the constitutionality of both statutes
because a state agency could not challenge the constitutionality of a statute.
Although the DNR conceded that generally a state agency could not attack
a statute's constitutionality, it argued that in limited circumstances, a state
agency could challenge a statute's constitutionality if it presented an issue
of great public concern. Silver Lake argued, however, that the great
public concern exception applies only to cases where a private litigant and

